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TOWARD THE UNCERTIFICATED SECURITY: A
CONGRESSIONAL LEAD FOR STATES TO FOLLOW*
EGON GUTTMAN**
The development of the concept of the uncertificated security and of
the policy leading to the immobolization of the certificated security was
accelerated by the "paperwork crunch" of the late 1960's.1 An explosion
in the volume of trading had occurred. A system designed to handle an
average three million share trading day was incapable of dealing with the
thirteen million share trading day common in the late 1960's.2 The resul-
tant breakdown in the securities processing mechanism caused chaos as
the number of errors in recording transactions multiplied.3 The securities
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' The paperwork crunch created a crisis in that the sudden increase in trading volume
resulted in an expansion of trading facilities, without a concomitant expansion in the sup-
porting areas, the backrooms. This resulted in financial over-extension to produce customer
convenience and an attempt to use computer programming when neither the staff nor the
machinery was capable of effecting accurate trade recordation. The subsequent market de-
cline added to these woes. SENATE COM. ON BANKING, HOUSING & URBAN AFFAIRS, 92D
CONG., 2D SESS., SECUmTIES INDUSTRY STUDY (Comm. Print 1972); SENATE SUBCOMM. ON f
BANKING, HOUSING & URBAN AFFAIRS, 93D CONG., 1ST SESS., SECURIrEs INDUSTRY STUDY
(1973); SUBCOMM. ON CoMmERcE & FINANCE OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON INTERSTATE & FOREIGN
COMMERcE, 92D CONG., 2D SESS., SECuRITIES INDUSTRY STUDY (Subcomm. Print 1972); Ron-
BINS, WERNER, JOHNSON & GREENwALD, PAPER CRISIS IN THE SECURITIES INDUSTRY: CAUSES
AND CURES (1969).
2 Harold M. Williams, Chairman Securities and Exchange Commission, recently ad-
vised brokers to start planning for 150 million share days. The record so far is 81.6 million
shares traded on the New York Stock Exchange on October 10, 1979. On an average day 32
million shares were traded in 1979, up from 28 million in 1978. See The Washington Post,
Nov. 30, 1979, at E-1, col. 3. The average daily volume for January 1980 was 52.5 million
shares.
3 SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION STUDY OF UNSAFE AND UNSOUND PRACTICES OF
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industry's operational problems created by the "paper crunch" are mea-
surable by the number of "fails to deliver" and "fails to receive" reported
by market participants.4 In December 1968, member firms of the New
York Stock Exchange had $4.4 billion in "fails to deliver" and $4.7 billion
in "fails to receive."" Brokers and dealers were finding it difficult, if not
impossible, to ascertain their own financial condition.' In late 1969, as the
prices of stocks began to decline reducing both volume and brokers' com-
misions, broker and dealer liquidations became common. This operational
and financial crisis forced more than one hundred brokerage firms into
liquidation causing thousands of customers to be seriously
disadvantaged.
7
The causes of such failures of broker-dealers have been analyzed as
being primarily due to inadequacies of management, deplorable book-
keeping methods and recording of trades, excessive trading and a concen-
tration on sales rather than service to the customer, and most impor-
tantly, a weakness in the capital structure of the broker-dealer.8 In its
BROKERS AND DEAI.ERS, H.R. Doc. No. 92-231, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1971) [hereinafter
cited as STUDY OF UNSAFE AND UNSOUND PRACTICES].
" A "fail to deliver" represents the obligation of a broker or dealer to deliver securities
to another broker or dealer against the receipt of money beyond the conventional five busi-
ness day settlement period. A "fail to receive," the converse of a "fail to deliver," represents
the obligation of a broker or dealer to pay money to another broker or dealer against receipt
of a security after the settlement period has passed.
6 Clearance and Settlement of Securities Transactions: Hearings on S.3412, S.3297
and S.2551 Before the Subcomm. on Securities of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing
and Urban Affairs, 92d Cong., 2d Seas. 95-96 (1972) (statement of William J. Carey, chron.).
6Id.
7 SENATE CoMM. ON BANKING, HOUSING & URBAN AFFAIRS, IMPROVED NATIONAL SECUrI-
TIns TRANSFER SYSTEM, S. REP. No. 92-1009, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (report to accompany
S.3876).
8 See STAFF OF SPECIAL SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS OF THE COMM. ON INTERSTATE &
FOREIGN COMMERCE, 92D CONG., 1ST SEAss., REvIEw OF THE SEC RECORDS OF THE DEMISE OF
SEL.CTED BROKER-DAuIERS (Subcomm. Print 1971); STUDY OF UNSAFE AND UNSOUND PRAC-
TiCES, supra note 3; BARUCH, WALL STREET SECURITY RISK (1971). Of the sixty-four securi-
ties firms liquidated under the Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970, 15 U.S.C. §§
78aaa-78iii (1976 & Supp. II 1978) (SIPA), through Dec. 31, 1972, the causes of failure are
indicated to have been:
Poor Books and Records 44
Misconduct 26
High Operating Costs -
Poor Control 21
Mismanagement 28
Lack of Knowledge of
Securities Business 18
Adverse Market Conditions 10
Dealing in Highly
Speculative Issues 29
To this table must'be added lack of adequate capital ranging from too small a capital basis;
50 firms (approximately 80%) had an initial capital of less than $50,000; thirty of these, less
than $25,000; and eleven of these, less than $10,000; one even as little as $4,000; to tempo-
rary illiquidity, overcommitment in a particular security or venture, etc. Also of note is that
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Study of Unsafe and Unsound Practices of Brokers and Dealers," the
Securities and Exchange Commission (the Commission) indicated that
the greatest opportunity to prevent recurrence of a paperwork crisis and
the resultant danger of financial loss to the investing public existed in
creating a modernized nation-wide system for clearance, settlement, de-
livery and transfer of securities.10 Because of the necessity of participat-
ing in various markets having different processing systems for clearing,
settlement and delivery, brokers' and dealers' costs and accounting con-
trol problems were multipled. Congress, therefore, concluded that it was
essential to create a national system for clearance and settlement of se-
curities transactions which will integrate the national market system for
securities ordained by it."' This required putting into place a coordinating
mechanism to ensure cooperation among the various entities engaged in
securities processing: the clearing corporations, the securities depositories,
the transfer agents and the issuers. 2 In addition, Congress called upon
the Commission to bring about an end to the physical movement of secur-
ities certificates in connection with the settlement of transactions among
brokers and dealers. s This legislation provides a legal basis for rulemak-
ing aimed at preventing another intra-industry paperwork crisis and es-
tablishing a safe, efficient and modern national clearing and settlement
system.
14
The Congress further directed the Commission to "facilitate the es-
.tablishment of a national system for the prompt and accurate clearance
and settlement of transactions in securities;"' 5 a directive to which the
Commission responded by formulating the characteristics of a national
clearing and settlement system which involves the interaction of clearing
corporations, securities depositories, transfer agents, brokers and dealers,
and securities markets.' The system which is evolving is one applicable
to the securities industry as such and does not affect the individual inves-
tor, unless the investor insists on becoming a registered owner of his
shares or desires to hold the certificate himself, i.e., the system applies to
forty-nine firms (approximately 77%) had been in business less than five years. See SEcuPi-
TIES INVESTOR PROTECTION CORPORATON, 2D ANNuAL REP. 25 (1972). The SIPA has been
amended by the Securities Investor Protection Act Amendments of 1978, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78aaa
et seq. (1976 & Supp. H 1978) and the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 11 U.S.C. §§ 101 et
seq. (Supp. 1 1978).
" See note 3 supra.
10 STUDy OF UNsAsE AND UNsouND PRACTiCs, supra note 3, at 35-36.
11 See Securities Exhange Act §§ 11A(a)(1), 17A(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78k-l(a)(1), 78q-
1(a)(1) (1976).
12 See In re National Securities Clearing Corporation For Registration as a Clearing
Agency, SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 34-13,163 (Jan. 13, 1977), 42 Fed. Reg.
3916, 3918 [hereinafter cited as Order].
13 See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended by Securities Acts Amendments
Act of 1975 § 17A(e), 15 U.S.C. § 78q-l(e) (1976).
" See Order, supra note 12, at 3919.
15 Securities Exchange Act § 17A(a)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 78q-1(a)(2) (1976).
'" See Order, supra note 12, at 3920.
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securities held in "street name.' 7
State laws provide that the issuer only needs to recognize as registered
owner of its securities those whose names appear on the stockholders' list.
Thus, rights to membership can be made effective only by notation on
this list.'8 So long as securities ownership was confined to a miniscule
investor class the concept was adequate. As ownership became more
widespread, however, complications inevitably ensued. These complica-
tions were due primarily to the commercial necessity of recognizing
"transfers" by sale, pledge or gift, effective as between transferor and
transferee without regard to changes on the stockholders' list. 9 At the
same time the issuer could not be bound to recognize the transferee for
any purpose, e.g., voting or the distribution of dividends, until the stock-
holders' list had been appropriately changed, or at least until the issuer
had notice of a transfer and a change was properly requested. 0 It thus
became important to discover whether the system, as it existed, was effec-
tive in soliciting the views of the benefical owner 21 and in bringing such
views to the attention of the issuer.
2
" Recordation of securities in the name of a registered broker/dealer or in that of a
national bank or their respective nominees is called registration in "street name." Securities
registered in the names of members of certain national securities exchanges, e.g., N.Y.S.E.
and AMEX and of certain national banks, or their respective nominees are easily transfera-
ble among members of the securities industry. Though requiring endorsement, there is no
need for a "signature guaranty" and a delivery does not need to be accompanied by a corpo-
rate resolution authorizing a transfer. Basically, where the signature guaranty of a broker/
dealer or of a bank would be acceptable to a transfer agent, certificates registered in the
name of such broker/dealer or that of a bank properly endorsed would not require a signa-
ture guaranty to be accepted for transfer. Note also that in many instances facsimile signa-
tures are acceptable under special agreement among members of the securities industry. See
U.S. Fidel. & Guar. Co. v. Coca-Cola Co., 10 UCC Rep. 759 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.), aff'd, 338
N.Y.S.2d 397 (App. Div. 1972); New York Stock Exchange Rule 200(d); American Stock
Exchange Rule 765(c); New York Stock Transfer Ass'n Rule 19.05; C. ISRAELS & E.
GUTrrMAN, MODERN SECURiTIEs TRANSFERS 5.02 (1971 & 1980 Supp.) [hereinafter cited as
MODERN SECURITIES].
18 See U.C.C. § 8-207. Article 8 of the U.C.C. has been enacted in all jurisdictions in the
United States. This provision is carried over into the Revised Article 8 (1977).
1" See note 2 supra.
20 See U.C.C. § 8-301.
21 See Securities Exchange Act § 12(m), 15 U.S.C. § 781(m) (1976); FINAL REPORT OF
THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION ON THE PRACTICE OF RECORDING THE OWNERSHIP
OF SECURITIES IN THE RECORDS OF THE ISSUER IN OTHER THAN THE NAME OF THE BENEFICIAL
OWNER OF SUCH SECURITIES (Dec. 3, 1976) (pursuant to § 12(m) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 ('34 Act)) [hereinafter cited as FINAL REPORT].
" See Securities Exchange Act §§ 12(m), 13, 14, 15(d), 16 and 17A, 15 U.S.C. §§ 781(m),
781m, 78n, 78o(d), 78p and 78q-1 (1976 and Supp. II 1978). With respect to the disclosure of
beneficial ownership, SEC Rule 13d-1 and Schedule 13d, 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.13d-1, 101 (1980),
require the beneficial owner of five percent of the securities of an issuer whose securities are
registered under § 12 of the '34 Act, or which but for the exemption set forth in §
12(g)(2)(G) would have to be registered to report such beneficial ownership. A beneficial
owner is defined as including "any person who, directly or indirectly, through any contract,
arrangement, understanding, relationship, or otherwise has or shares," voting power and/or
investment power. SEC Rule 13d-3, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-3 (1980). This would include a
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Congress called upon the Commission to study and report on the rela-
tionship of the corporate issuer to the beneficial owners of its shares
where these are registered in "street name. '23 The study concluded that
"the current system for transmitting issuer-shareowner communications
through intermediaries functions reasonably well... while transmission
through intermediaries is more circuitous, materials are received by
shareowners [sic] in a timely manner whether they are transmitted di-
rectly by an issuer or through an intermediary."'2' Although the study
contains some conlcusions which are open to question, such as that the
system of communication between issuers and beneficial owners is ade-
quate, a closer control over the intermediaries could eliminate these ques-
tions. These difficulties do not affect the ultimate conclusion that the in-
terest of the beneficial owner could be adequately protected even where
securities are held by a securities depository25 and registered in its nomi-
nee name, i.e., "street name."
The Commission is also able to protect shareholders' proprietary in-
terests in securities by requiring broker-dealers to segregate customers'
fully paid26 and excess margin securities2 7 Brokers use "bulk segregation
pledgee who has foreclosed on his pledge, or who, under the pledge agreement, has voting
rights or power to dispose of the pledged security, id., but would not include a clearing
agency or its nominee. Depository Trust Co.; Cede & Co., [1979 Transfer Binder] FaD. SEc.
L. REP. (CCH) 82,192 (SEC Div. of Corp. Fin. - Interpretative Letter March 23, 1979).
'3 See note 21 supra.
" See FINAL REPORT, note 21 supra, at 42.
25 See Securities Exchange Act § 3(a)(23)(A), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(23)(A) (1976) (person
who (i) acts as custodian of securities in connection with system for central handling of
securities whereby all securities of particular class or series of any issue deposited within the
system are treated as fungible and may be transferred, loaned, or pledged by bookkeeping
entry without physical delivery of securities certificates; or (ii) otherwise permits or facili-
tates settlement of securities transactions or the hypothecation or lending of securities with-
out physical delivery of securities certificates). The largest securities depository, Depository
Trust Co. (DTC) is owned by the New York Stock Exchange (N.Y.S.E.), the American
Stock Exchange (A.S.E.), National Association of Securities' Dealers (N.A.S.D.), broker/
dealers and bank participants. Note that U.C.C. § 8-102(4) defines "'A 'custodian bank' is a
bank or trust company which is supervised and examined by state or federal authority hav-
ing supervision over banks and which is acting as a custodian for a clearing corporation."
' See SEC Rules 15c3-3(a)(3), (4), 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.15c3-3(a)(3), (4) (1980) (defines
"fully paid securities" to include all securities carried for a customer in a special cash ac-
count (see Regulation T of the Federal Reserve System, 12 C.F.R. § 220 (1980)) as well as all
margin account securities which have become fully paid).
'7 See SEC Rule 15c3-3(a)(5), 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-3(a)(5) (1980). Excess margin secur-
ities are those securities in the margin account having a market value in excess of 140% of
the total debit balance in the customer's account. Id. Where the securities are not held by
the broker and where they are not in a securities depository, e.g., they are held by a clearing
broker, such clearing broker will have to segregate the securities so as to effectuate delivery
on behalf of the broker to his customer under state law. See U.C.C. § 8-313(1)(e); In re
Paragon Securities Co., 599 F.2d 551 (3d Cir. 1979). Entries on the books of the broker will
not suffice. See also SEC Rule 15c3-3(c)(2), 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-3(c)(2) (1980). Where the
securities are held in a securities depository, however, entries on the books of the clearing
corporation will be effective to make the transferee or pledgee who has an account with the
clearing corporation, i.e., a participant, a "holder" under state law, so as to enable him to
1980]
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of street name securities" which segregates these securities by issuer and
issues and not in customers' names. In such case the segregation will be
by book entries on the broker's books. Where the securities are held in a
clearing corporation,28 they will be kept in a general account. This ac-
count will contain all securities creditied to the participant. If a broker,
the account will contain fully paid for, excess margin and securities sub-
ject to liens other than securities which have been hypothecated 29 Securi-
ties in such a general account with the clearing corporation are deemed to
be in the control of the broker providing the delivery of such securities to
qualify as a bona fide purchaser. See U.C.C. §§ 8-313(l)(e), 8-320(1) & (3), 8-302. As at
present promulgated, clearing agents which are not registered broker/dealers would not
qualify as control locations, neither under SEC Rule 15c3-3(c)(2) nor under SEC Rule 15c3-
3(c)(1). This clearly calls for some reconsideration of SEC Rule 15c3-3(c)(2) to include such
clearing agents which seek registration and to require them to segregate customer fully paid
and excess margin securities in accordance with instructions received from participants. See
note 30 infra (delivery to customer where securities are held in clearing corporation). See
also MODERN SEcurrMs, supra note 17, § 4.02.
" See Securities Exchange Act § 3(a)(23)(A), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(23)(A) (1976) (defines
a "clearing agency" as "any person who acts as an intermediary in making payments or
deliveries or both in connection with transactions in securities or who provides facilities for
comparison of data respecting the terms of settlement of securities transactions, to reduce
the number of settlements of securities transactions or for the allocation of securities settle-
ment responsibilities"). This definition includes a securities depository.
The U.C.C., which permits delivery by book entry within a central depository system,
see U.C.C. § 8-320, defines a clearing corporation as a corporation
(a) at least 90 percent of the capital stock of which is held by or for one or more
persons (other than individuals), each of whom
(i) is subject to supervision or regulation pursuant to the provision of fed-
eral or state banking laws or state insurance laws, or
(ii) is a broker or dealer or investment company registered under the Se-
curities Exchange Act of 1934 or the Investment Company Act of 1940, or
(iii) is a national securities exchange or association registered under a
statute of the United States such as the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
and none of whom, other than a national securities exchange or association,
holds in excess of 20 percent of the capital stock of such corporation; and
(b) any remaining capital stock which is held by individuals who have purchased
such capital stock at or prior to the time of their taking office as directors of such
corporation and who have purchased only so much of such capital stock as may be
necessary to permit them to qualify as such directors.
U.C.C. § 8-102(3). The 1977 amendments add: a "clearing corporation is a corporation regis-
tered as a "clearing agency" under the federal securities laws .... .
This provision permits the clearing corporation to be wholly owned by a national securi-
ties exchange or association registered under a statute such as the '34 Act. The possible
participation of two other groups is recognized (1) brokers, dealers, or investment companies
registered under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 or the Investment Company Act of
1940 and (2) banks and insurance companies subject to the provisions of federal or state
banking laws or state insurance laws. A broker, dealer, bank, or insurance company may
own up to 20 percent of the captial stock of the clearing corporations. Individuals also may
own capital stock, provided they purchased such stock in order to qualify as directors before
taking office. This permits compliance with the requirements of the Securities and Exchange
Commission that there be "fair representation" of participants. See note 50 infra.
"' See SEC Rule 15c2-1(g), 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c2-1(g) (1980).
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the broker would not require the payment of money or value. They can
be segregated by entries on the books of the broker for the purpose for
complying with Commission rules calling for the segregation of fully paid
and excess margin securities.8 0
Congress also added to customers'3 ' protection against loss due to bro-
ker-dealers' insolvency by enacting the Securities Investor Protection
Act.s2 Once the determination had been made that the beneficial owner
could be given adequate protection, consumer obstacles to the immobliza-
tion of the share certificate no longer existed. In fact, the need for an
efficient trading market demanded that such immobilization apply to se-
curities held in a trading account.
8 3
Upon making a sale, the selling broker assumes a legal duty, generally
defined under the rules and customs of the organized securities markets
in terms of a responsibility of the broker to deliver: (a) by placing the
security received from his customer or a like securitiy, in the possession
of the buying broker, or (b) by effecting clearance of the sale under the
rules and customs of the relevant market.34 These obligations arise irre-
spective of the performance by customers of their legal duties.8 5 Resolu-
tion of the broker's obligations incurred on an exchange or in the over-
the-counter market (OTC) generally requires (1) comparison, (2) clear-
See SEC Rules 8c-1 and 15c3-3(c)(1), 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.8c-1, 240.15c3-3(c)(1) (1980).
Entries in the books of the broker indicating the customer's name should suffice to consti-
tute "delivery" of securities held for the broker by the clearing corporation. We are here
assimilating the U.C.C. term "possession" to the securities law term "control." See SEC
Rule 15c3-3(b)(c), 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-3(b)(c) (1980); In re Paragon Securities Co., 599
F.2d 551 (3d Cir. 1979).
3' Persons who have entrusted securities or cash to the broker-dealer, debtor for a pur-
pose connected with participation in the securities market are examples of a "customer"
that Congress is seeking to protect. See Securities Investor Protection Act, §§ 16(2), (4), 15
U.S.C. §§ 78111(2), (4) (Supp. II 1978); SEC v. F. 0. Baroff Co., 497 F.2d 280 (2d Cir. 1974)
(securities lent to debtor and subsequently hypothecated to relieve its "cash bind" will not
afford "customer" status to lender); In re Weis Securities, Inc., 425 F. Supp. 212 (S.D.N.Y.
1977) (investor in subordinated debt or broker-dealer is not a customer).
"2 15 U.S.C. § 78111 (Supp. II 1978). The Act's protection is up to $100,000, of which
$40,000 can be applied to cash held by the broker. See id. § 78fff. There is legislation pend-
ing to increase these sums to $500,000 and $100,000 respectively, See H.R. REP. No. 6831
which has been reported out of the Interstate and Foreign Commerce Subcommittee on
Consumer Protection and Finance.
" A trading account is an active account in which the customer may transact numerous
purchases and sales requiring delivery into and out of such account. The delay in having the
securities registered into and out of the customer's name would prevent the broker comply-
ing with the time restraints governing delivery of securities imposed by the market in which
the trades occur. The Commission's turnaround rules for transfer agents and registrars can-
not alleviate against this delay. See SEC Rules 17Ad-1 to 7, 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.17Ad-1 to 7
(1980); MODERN SEcuRmEs, supra note 17, §§ 2.07-2.11.
See U.C.C. §§ 8-107(1), 8-314(1)(b), 8-320.
" Brokers act as agents for unnamed principals. Thus, both under common law princi-
ples and under market rules the broker is personally liable to his counter-part on the trans-
actions. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 321 (1958); N.Y.S.E. Rules 175-180; A.S.E.
(Div. of Securities) Rules SR 1-6; N.A.S.D. Uniform Practice Code § 12.
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ance, and (3) settlement.
(1) Comparison - Upon reaching an agreement to sell or to buy,
whether on the exchange auction market or on the telephone in an OTC
transaction, or through access to the computer on the Cincinnati Ex-
change,86 information regarding the buy and sell side is sent to a clearing
agency by the brokers involved for comparison, i.e., each buy will have to
be matched with the corresponding sell slip on the basis of the informa-
tion submitted (the parties, the amount and identity of the securities and
the price).
(2) Clearance - Once the trade has been verified, the "compared
trade" is "cleared" by the clearing agency.37 This involves sorting the va-
rious trades according to brokers and advising the brokers of their deliv-
ery or payment obligations arising from the "compared trade." Of the
three major systems of clearance, the simplest form is known as "the
trade by trade" system (TBT). Brokers under this system deal directly
with each other to settle each trade as it arises, once comparison has es-
tablished their respective obligations.38
The process of clearance by book entry movement is one of the most
important features of a national clearance system. Book entry movement
occurs when one participant's 9 account is debited and another's is credi-
tied to reflect a transfer of securities when the securities are registered in
the name of the clearing agency and held by the clearing agency for its
participants.0 The use of book entries facilitates a second and more so-
" Note, some regional exchanges facilitate computerized trades and automatic execu-
tion in some infrequently traded securities, e.g., Pacific Stock Exchange (COMEX), Phila-
delphia Stock Exchange (PACE) and even the N.Y.S.E. has adopted a Designated Order
Turn-around System (DOT) through which N.Y.S.E. member firms transmit small-size or-
ders direct from computers in their own offices to the proper trading post on the exchange
floor.
37 See Securities Exchange Act § 3(a)(23)(A), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(23)(A) (1976); U.C.C. § 8-
102(3).
The organized market limits the concept of "good" delivery as between members of
the market to cases where the form of the registration and the corresponding indorsement
has no feature which could conceivably give notice of an adverse claim to the security. See
U.C.C. § 8-301(1). Thus these rules exclude from "good" delivery all securities indorsed by:
(a) any person "since deceased";
(b) a trustee or any other fiduciary;
(c) an infant;
(d) an agent;
(e) an attorney other than an attorney in fact acting for a member organization
of the exchange;
(f) two or more individuals described as joint tenants or otherwise with any
"qualification, restriction or special designation"; and
(g) a corporation or other institution or organization unless there has been filed
with the transfer agent a certified copy of a resolution authorizing the actual
signer to indorse.
N.Y.S.E Rules 195-225; A.S.E. (Div. of Securities) Rules SR 34-44; N.A.S.D. Uniform Prac-
tice Code §§ 29-38.
" See Securities Exchange Act § 3(a)(24), 15 U.S.C.§ 78c(a)(24) (1976).
40 See Order, supra note 12, at n.51.
[Vol. XXXVII
THE UNCERTIFICATED SECURITY
phisticated system to be used in an active market and where equipment
such as computers, etc., are available, "the daily balance order system"
(DBO).' 1 Here, the clearing agency will generate a daily net "buy" or
"sell" position for each issue in which a participant in the clearing agency
has a "compared trade" due that day. It will then allocate or issue to such
participants balance orders to deliver or to receive a net buy or sell posi-
tion. This may result in payment or delivery being made to or received
from someone with whom there had been no "compared trade. 4 2 Linked
to a depository, physical delivery is also obviated.
Finally, the most sophisticated system is the "continuous net settle-
ment" system (CNS). The clearing agency will net the daily "buy" and
"sell" position for each issue in which the participant has a compared
trade due to be settled that day and, if not resolved, will carry such net
settlement obligations over to the next day to be settled against the obli-
gations resolved by the end of that day.'3 Under this system, the clearing
agency is interposed between the market participants. Thus, the obliga-
tions to pay for or to deliver securities is to the clearing agency, which in
turn is obligated to make payment to or to deliver securities to the other
side of the "compared trade."
(3) Settlement - Comparison and clearance must be completed by
the day when the market rules call for the settlement, i.e., delivery and
payment. Essentially, there are two types of settlement procedures. One
type of settlement procedure occurs where deliveries are effected periodi-
cally (e.g., daily) by the physical exchange at the clearing house or on its
instructions of "balancing certificates." Thus Broker A obligated to de-
liver 5,000 shares of XYZ common and entitled to receive 4,500 such
shares from Brokers B, C, and D, would at the end of the day deliver to
the clearing house in "street name" (his own or that of another broker or
bank nominee) one or more certificates aggregating 500 shares. Similarly
if the transactions result in a balance in his favor he would receive certifi-
cates in "street name" for such balance through the clearing house, i.e.,
"envelope delivery.""
The second type of settlement procedure is "delivery by book entry."
Where brokers' or banks' holdings of fungible securities in "street name"
are physically held by a securities depository 5 acting for a "clearing cor-
' The "daily balance order system" (DBO) will also be possible without book entry,
but will be less efficient if so used.
4 See In re Weis Securities, Inc., 542 F.2d 840, 841 (2d Cir. 1976).
4" Since many securities are traded in more than one market, and brokers participate in
more than one market, interfaces between clearing agencies are required to enable broker/
dealers to settle in one account at one clearing agency with regard to all trades wherever
entered into.
" See In re Weis Securities, Inc., 542 F.2d 840 (2d Cir. 1976). Payment through the
clearing agency generally requires tender of a certified check or banker's draft against
tender of securities.
5 See Securities Exchange Act § 3(a)(23)(A), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(23)(A) (1976); U.C.C. §
8-102(4).
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poration"-'4 delivery is accomplished by the making of appropriate entries
"on the books of the clearing corporation.' 1 7 Such entries will be made on
instructions of the transferor "to decrease the shares of the stock in his
account and to increase the account of the receiver by the same number
of shares. Appropiate bookkeeping entries would be made in the account
of both parties but no physical handling of certificates will occur. 4 8 In
the CNS system, settlement of a compared trade is guaranteed by the
clearing agency. Thus, the CNS system provides a link with the deposi-
tory so that automatic book entry delivery will be possible to satisfy a
short value position.49 In all other systems, this obligation generally is on
the participants themselves. Participants, of course, must settle directly
with the clearing agency in the CNS system.50
The U.C.C. provides a legal framework for this methodology of mak-
ing delivery among market participants. 1 Thus U.C.C. section 8-313(1)(e)
46 Securities Exchange Act § 3(a)(23)(A), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(23)(A) (1976); U.C.C. § 8-
102(3).
47 U.C.C. § 8-320(1)(c). The clearing corporation will give instructions to the securities
depository to increase the account of the participant entitled to delivery and will expect
delivery to its account from the selling participant.
4' Memorandum to Members and Member Organizations of the N.Y.S.E. on "Method
for Central Handling of Securities," (July 30, 1964). See also U.C.C. §§ 8-313(1)(e), 8-320(2)
& (3). The development of "clearing corporations" and their control by the Commission is
set forth in the Securities Exchange Act §§ 3(a)(23), 17A and 19, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78c(a)(23),
78q-1, 78s (1976), and SEC Rule 17Ab2-1, 17 C.F.R. § 240.17Ab2-1 (1980). See further
Bradford Nat'l Clearing Corp. v. SEC, 590 F.2d 1085 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
,8 A "short value position" is a net obligation of a participant to deliver securities to
the system against payment. A "long value position" obligates a participant to make pay-
ment to receive securities from the system.
1* Where delivery of a physical certificate is called for, there must be "good delivery."
See note 37 supra. A failure to make "good" delivery gives rise to rights of rejection under
the applicable market rules. These "reclamation" rights arise not only by reason of irregu-
larities which would entitle the issuer to refuse registration of transfer, but also where minor
irregularities would cause a delay in obtaining registration. See N.Y.S.E. Rules 268, 270,
272, 275; A.S.E. (Div. of Securities) Rules SR 112, 113, 115, 117, 120; N.A.S.D. Uniform
Practice Code §§ 53, 54, 55, 57; MODERN S.cul'rIES, supra note 17, § 6.07.
11 See notes 25 and 28 supra. Securities Exchange Act § 17A(b)(3)(C), 15 U.S.C. § 78q-
1(b)(3)(C) (1976), requires assurance of fair representation to participants in a "clearing
agency," a concern reflected also in U.C.C. § 8-102(3) which encourages use of depository
facilities by non-brokers. The U.C.C. effectively permits distribution of the capital stock of
depositories among their users creating a corporate form of ownership and control, which
comports with the efforts of the Congress to ensure "fair representation to participants."
Although Securities Exchange Act § 17A(b)(3)(C) indicates that "fair representation" might
mean "ownership of voting stock" this has not yet been made a requirement. See S. REP.
No. 94-75, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 123-24, reprinted in [1975] U.S. CODE CONGRESSIONAL AND
ADimSTRATv N-ws 179, 301. The Commission recognizes that owners of an organization
usually have voting and administrative powers over their holdings. Compliance with the
statutory requirement of "fair representation of participants," however, will be determined
by the Commission on a case by case basis and has not been predicated on the existence of
voting rights in participants. See Regulations of Clearing Agencies, SEC Securities Ex-
change Act Release No. 34-14,531 (March 16, 1978) [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc.
L. REP. (CCH) 1 81,525; Standards For the Registration of Clearing Agencies, Securities
[Vol. XXXVII1
THE UNCERTIFICATED SECURITY
provides that "delivery to a purchaser occurs when appropriate entries on
the books of a clearing corporation are made under section 8-320.' 's2 This
method of delivery to a broker/participant will not effectuate a registra-
tion of transfer so as to make a customer of the broker/participant a reg-
istered owner,5 3 nor will it result in delivery to the broker/participant's
customer who is not itself a participant." The securities will remain regis-
tered in street name, i.e., that of the depository or its nominee. The bro-
ker will be able to direct the depository to have securities presented to
the transfer agent for registration of transfer into the customer's name,
however, and will thereby be able to make delivery to the cutomer should
the customer so desire. If securities that are fully paid for or excess mar-
gin (are held in a segregated "customers' account" with a clearing-bro-
ker), book entry on the broker/dealer's books should suffice.5 5 Federal se-
curities regulations do not call for a segregated "customers' account" in a
depository which is a subsidiary of "either [a] national securities ex-
change or of a registered national securities association or of a custodian
bank."" Securities in such location are deemed to be in the control of the
broker or dealer and can be segregated on his books. By assimilating the
terms "possession" in U.C.C. section 8-313(1)(c) to the term "control," we
submit that securities in a general account with such registered deposi-
tory can be delivered to a customer by "book entries" on the broker/
dealer's book. The present book entry system has streamlined the trans-
fer of securities, but is still based on the possibility of an eventual deliv-
Exchange Act Release No. 34-16,900 (June 17, 1980), 3 FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 1 26,2036.
See also Aronstein, A Certificateless Article 8?. We Can Have it Both Ways, 31 Bus. LAW.
727, 734 (1976).
" The Commission's standards for the Registration of Clearing Agencies, supra note
50, requires that the agency have rules which provide that the agency is liable to the partici-
pants for a failure to deliver securities where such failure is due to (1) the negligence or
misconduct of the clearing agency or its custodian; (2) a claim by the clearing agency against
any fully-paid-for participant's securities; (3) larceny;, (4) mysterious disappearance or (5)
any other cause for which the clearing agency has assumed responsibility. The standard is
higher than that of an ordinary bailee for hire. U.C.C. § 8-320(5) indicates that a failure to
make appropriate entries "does not affect the validity or effect of the entries," but will give
rise to "liabilities or obligations of the clearing corporation to any person adversely affected
thereby." Thus, conceivably one whose rights were adversely affected by such entries could
sue the clearing corporation to require that they be corrected or, in an appropriate case, for
conversion of his securities. The Commission by setting a high standard predicating liability
to participants, will not make it possible for clearing agencies to contract out from such
liability without risking deregistration as a clearing agency and thus being unable to func-
tion as such.
53 U.C.C. § 8-320(4).
"Normally, a broker's customer, other than an institutional customer such as a bank
or an insurance company, will not be a participant. Thus the broker cannot make delivery to
his customer by means of book entries in the clearing agency under U.C.C. § 8-313(1)(d).
" See SEC rule 15c3-3(c)(2), 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-3(c)(2) (1980); Mattysse v. Securities
Processing Servs., Inc., 444 F. Supp. 1009, 1018 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). The broker not being, in
possession of the certificate cannot make delivery by entry on his books, however. See
U.C.C. § 8-313(1)(c); In re Paragon Securities Co., 599 F.2d 551, 556-57 (3d Cir. 1979).
" See SEC Rule 15c3-3(c)(1), 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-3(c)(1) (1980).
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ery of the stock cerificate not only to a non-participant, but also to a
participant in the system.
A national system for clearance and settlement must be structured so
as to enable participants to compare, clear and settle all their transac-
tions through one entity regardless of the market in which the trade is
executed or the location of the other party to the transaction provided he
qualifies as a participant. This function is called "one account process-
ing." Although a participant should be able to obtain one account
processing through one clearing agency, it should also be possible to di-
vide these functions as the participants see fit. Comparison should be per-
formed through the clearing agency affiliated with the marketplace in
which the trade occurred.5 7 The comparison instructions can then be di-
rected to another clearing agency to perform the clearing function which
would generate settlement instructions. 58 A number of clearing agencies
have been granted interim registration by the Commission; so far none
have been granted permanent registration (a) because the Commission's
standards for the registration of clearing agencies have only now been
promulgated,5 9 and (b) so far, none have demonstrated an ability fully to
comply with requirements imposed by the CommisssonY' In its order
granting interim registration to National Securities Clearing Corporation
(NSCC) the Commission explained that the registration of NSCC was "an
essential step toward the establishment, at an early date, of a comprehen-
sive network of linked clearance and settlement systems and branch facil-
ities with the national scope, efficiencies and safeguards envisioned by
Congress in enacting the 1975 Amendments." '81 The Commission there-
fore imposed a "free interface condition" which requires NSCC to offer
57 Prior to the merger into National Securities Clearing Corporation (NSCC), clearance
on the N.Y.S.E. was through the N.Y. Stock Clearance Corporation (SCC), on the American
Stock Exchange through American Stock Exchange Clearing Corporation (ASECC), and in
the over-the-counter market, members of the N.A.S.D. cleared through the National Clear-
ing Corporation (NCC), a subsidiary of the N.A.S.D. of which Bradford National Clearing
Corporation (BNCC) was the facilities manager. BNCC was the facilities manager for at
least one other regional stock exchange clearing corporation, i.e., The Pacific Stock Ex-
change's Pacific Service Corporation. The creation of NSCC did not result in clearing agen-
cies outside New York becoming a part of NSCC. It is interesting to note that NSCC was
structured so as to comply with U.C.C. § 8-102(3). This required imposing restrictions on
transfer of NSCC stock. See Order, supra note 12, at 3924.
" The possibility of using a depository not linked to the clearing agency which gener-
ated the settlement instructions should not be precluded; the Commission recognized that
innovation at the depository level should be encouraged. See Order, supra note 12, at 3921.
5' See SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 34-16900 (June 17, 1980), 3 FED. SEc.
L. REP. (CCH) 26,2036.
" Interim or temporary registration can only be effective for a period of eighteen
months, unless the Commission by order provides for a longer period. Within nine months
of such interim registration the Commission must determine whether to institute proceed-
ings to grant or deny registration. See SEC Rule 17Ab2-1(c), 17 C.F.R. § 240.17Ab2-1(c)
(1980).
"l Order, supra note 12, at 3917. The reference here is to the Securities Acts Amend-
ment Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-29, 89 Stat. 146 (June 4, 1975).
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and establish full interfaces with other CNS systems without interface
charges . 2 The Commission indicated that by providing such interface
without charge, NSCC would facilitate a national clearing and settlement
system of interfaced entities where brokers and dealers will execute
trades in the marketplace which offers the best price3 and will then be
able to use the clearing corporation of their choice. A second requirement
is the "remote comparison condition" imposed by the Commission. This
requires NSCC to provide at cost the same comparison facilities to NSCC
participants located outside of New York City and to participants in
other clearing corporations as are presently provided to these participants
in New York City, i.e., the Commission required that there be "geo-
graphic price mutalization."' At the present stage of technological devel-
opment, comparison capabilities present the greatest obstacle to a na-
tional system for clearance.
6 5
A system applicable to the securities industry which permits the im-
62 A "full interface" enables a participant in one clearing corporation to compare, clear
and settle all its transactions eligible for clearance at both interfacing clearing corporations
at either of the interfacing clearing corporations. See Order, supra note 12, at 3929 n. 121.
63 Note the Intermarket Trading System (ITS) is an electronic communications net-
work that links the American, Boston, Midwest, New York, Pacific and Philadelphia Stock
Exchanges so as to enable execution of orders on the exchange showing the best price. The
system does not cover all securities listed on these exchanges.
" See Order, supra note 12, at 3929-30. The objective of geographic price mutualiza-
tion (GPM) is to expand the securities market into a geographically nationwide operation by
enabling brokers outside New York to "compete" more effectively with those inside New
York. Whether it allocates resources more efficiently is doubtful. It may prove to be anti-
competitive since it subsidizes regional brokers at the expense of those located in New York.
Bradford National Clearing Corporation (BNCC) challenged this condition claiming that it
would result in greater use of the New York market. The D.C. Circuit Court remanded this
issue to the Commission "for a better explanation, if one exists, of how GPM may be utlized
without thwarting regional competition. Failing that, the Commission must either condition
registration on NSCC's abandonment of GPM, or at least convincingly conclude that the
loss of regional competition engendered by GPM will not upset the favorable balance of
benefits and anti-competitive effects that [the Commission] originally calculated on the as-
sumption that such competition would exist." Bradford National Clearing Corporation v.
SEC, 510 F.2d 1085, 1112-13 (D.C. Cir. 1978). BNCC also objected to NCC terminating its
facilities management contract with them and the Commission approving NSCC's appoint-
ment of Securities Industry Automation Corporation, a subsidiary of the N.Y.S.E. and the
AMEX, as "facilities manager and processor" for five years without giving BNCC an oppor-
tunity to bid for this contract. This matter also was remanded to determine "whether any
exercise of 'business judgment' by a clearing agency may affect the realization of the na-
tional clearing system envisioned by Congress - i.e., one that is safe, efficient, and competi-
tive." Id. at 1114 (emphasis in original).
45 See Bradford National Clearing Corporation v. SEC, 590 F.2d at 1098 n. 21. Thus at
first only participants in New York City were able to take advantage of NSCC's comparison
services regarding transactions on the N.Y.S.E., the AMEX and OTC. Participants outside
of New York City were able to submit only OTC transactions through the regional network
previously operated by NCC. The Commission now permits both listed and OTC securities
to be cleared through NSCC branches outside New York City. See SEC Securities Exchange
Act Releases Nos. 34-15640 (March 14, 1979), 34-16085 (Aug. 3, 1979), 34-16213 (Sept. 21,
1979).
1980]
730 WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW
mobilization of the stock certificate seems to be in place. Its extension to
the individual shareholder is possible through regulations of broker-deal-
ers and clearing agencies which must assure effective participation of ben-
eficial owners in corporate governance s as well as of disclosure of such
beneficial ownership to enable information to be made available to mar-
ket participants.6 7 The next logical step, therefore, would be to provide
for the abolition of the share certificate altogether and its replacement by
a computerized record of stock ownership kept by the issuer or his trans-
fer agent. Federal legislation regulating transfer agents"8 is in place and
has granted supervisory and rule-making powers to the Commission and
other "appropriate regulatory agenc[ies]."6 So far such regulations have
called for the registration of transfer agents70 and have introduced "turn-
around" and "record keeping"71 requirements applicable to the registra-
tion of transfer of certificated securities. Congress, recognizing that the
abolition of the securities certificate is but a matter of time, has in-
structed the Commission to include in its
annual report to Congress for each fiscal year . . . the steps the
Commission has taken and the progress it has made toward end-
ing the physical movement of the securities certificate in connec-
tion with the settlement of securities transactions, and its recom-
mendations, if any, for legistation to eliminate the securities
E.g., Securities Exchange Act § 14, 15 U.S.C. § 78n (1976); SEC Rules 14a-1 et seq.,
17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-1, et seq. (1980) (proxy solicitation rules).
62 E.g., Securities Exchange Act § 13(d), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (1976). SEC Rules 13d-1 et
seq., 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.13d-1 et seq. (1980).
0 Securities Exchange Act §§ 3(a)(25) and 17A(c)(d), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78c(a)(25) and 78q-
1(c)(d) (1976); SEC Rules 17Ad-1 et seq., 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.17Ad-1 et seq. (1980). Expressly
included in the definition of transfer agent are transfer agent depositories (TAD) which
transfer record ownership by bookkeeping entries without the physical issuance of certifi-
cates. See Securities Exchange Act § 3(a)(25)(E), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(25)(E) (1976).
"9 The "appropriate regulatory agencies" are:
(1) The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System for a state chartered bank
which is a member of the Federal Reserve System or for a bank holding company, or for a
subsidiary of such holding company or of such state chartered bank which is a bank that is
not required to register with the Comptroller of the Currency or the Federal Deposit Insur-
ance Corporation (FDIC);
(2) The Comptroller of the Currency for national banks, or a bank operatng under the
Code of Law for the District of Columbia, or their subsidiaries;
(3) The FDIC for a bank (or its subsidiary) which is insured by the FDIC other than a
bank that is a member of the Federal Reserve System;
(4) The Commission for all other transfer agents including a state chartered bank
which is not a member of the Federal Reserve System, is not insured by the FDIC, and is
not a subsidiary of a bank holding company (See (1) above). See Securities Exchange Act §
3(a)(34)(B), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(34)(B) (1976).
10 See Securities Exchange Act § 17A(c)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 78q-1(c) (1976); SEC Rule
17Ac2-1, 17 C.F.R. § 240.17Ac2-1 (1980). See also SEC Rule 17Ac3-1, 17 C.F.R. §
240.17Ac3-1 (1980) (withdrawal of registration); MODERN SECURTEs, supra note 17, § 2.08.
71 See SEC Rules 17Ad-1 et seq., 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.17Ad-1 et seq. (1980); MODERN SE-




The Commission has not yet gone as far as to recommend a certificat-
eless system. But by facilitating the immoblization of the certificate the
Commission has gone as far as it can without interfering with state law.7 3
To achieve the end result, the elimination of the stock certificate, state
laws will have to be amended so as not to require the issuance of a stock
certificate.74 It is the desire of Congress, however, to preserve the right of
7' Securities Exchange Act § 23(b)(4)(E), 15"U.S.C. § 78w(b)(4)(E) (1976) (emphasis
added).
73 The Commission has power to make such regulations as to the form or format of
registered securities as may be "necessary or appropriate for the prompt and accurate clear-
ance and settlement of transactions in securities." Securities Exchange Act § 12(t), 15 U.S.C.
781 (1) (1976). *
7' State corporation laws pertaining to share certificates:
a. States requiring that certificates by issued:
ALABAMA, ALA. CODE § 10-2-97 (1975)
ALASKA, ALASKA STAT. § 10.05.114 (1968)
ARIZONA, Aiz. IaV. STAT. ANN. § 10-023 (1977)
ARKANSAS, ARK. STAT. ANN. § 64-208 (1966)
COLORADO, CoLo. lav. STAT. § 7-4-108 (1973)
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, D.C. CODE ANN. § 29-908(g) (1973)
IDAHO, IDAHO CODE § 30-1-23 (1979)
ILLINOIS, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch.32 § 157.21 (Smith-Hurd) (1979)
IOWA, IOWA CODE ANN. § 496A.22 (West) (1962)
KENTUCKY, Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 271A.115 (1972)
MISSISSIPPI, MIss. CODE. ANN. § 79-3-43 (1972)
MONTANA, MONT. Rav. CODE ANN. § 15-2221 (1967)
NEBRASKA, NEB. REV. STAT. § 21-2022 (1977)
NEW JERSEY, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:7-11 (Supp. 1979)
NEW MEXICO, N.M. STAT. ANN. § 53-11-23 (1975)
NEW YORK, N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 508 (McKinney) (1963)
NORTH DAKOTA, N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-19-20 (1976)
OKLAHOMA, OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18 § 1-112 (1947)
OREGON, Oa. Rav. STAT. § 57.121 (1975)
PENNSYLVANIA, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15 § 1607 (Purdon) (1965)
RHODE ISLAND, R.L GEN. LAws § 7-1.1-21 (1969)
SOUTH DAKOTA, S.D. COM. LAWS ANN. § 47-3-12 (1967)
TEXAS, TEX. Bus. CORP. AcT. ANN. art. 2.19 (Vernon) (1956)
TENNESSEE, TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-509 (1979)
UTAH, UTAH CODE ANN. § 16-10-21 (1972)
VERMONT, VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11 § 1869 (1973)
VIRGINIA, VA. CODE § 13.1-20 (1950)
WASHINGTON, WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 23A.08.190 (1969)
WEST VIRGINIA, W. VA. CODE § 31-1-87 (1975)
WISCONSIN, Wis. STAT. ANN. § 180.18 (West) (1957)
WYOMING, Wyo. STAT. § 17-1-120 (1977)
b. States requiring the issuance of certificates upon the demand of any stockholder (each
stockholder entitled to a certificate):
CONNECTICUT, CONN. GEN. STAT. § 33-345 (1958)
DELAWARE, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 158 (1974)
FLORIDA, FLA. STAT. AmN. § 607.067 (West) (1977)
INDIANA, IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-2-6(f) (Burns) (1972)
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the shareholder to demand delivery of a stock certificate.75 Whether or
not a certificate is issued is, of course, irrelvant to establishing share own-
ership in a corporation.7 6 The sole requirement is entry on the stock-list.
Thus, even those states which still require the issuance of a share certifi-
cate, permit such certificates to be kept in a Transfer Agent Depository
(TAD). The TAD would keep computerized stockholder lists which would
serve both as issuer's stock records and stockholder's ownership records.
Through instructions, the TAD would effectuate book entry transfers be-
tween participants by credit and debit book entries, and also would issue
and deliver physical certificates if so directed. 77 It is thus clear that a
transaction in an uncertificated security will not be a "paperless" transac-
tion; written instruction to transfer will still be necessary.
78
KANSAS, KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-6408 (1974)
LOUISIANA, LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 12:57 (West) (1969)
MAINE, ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 13-A § 511 (1974)
MARYLAND, MD. ANN. CODE art. 23 § 27 (1973)
MASSACHUSETTS, MASS. ANN. LAWS. ch. 156 § 33 (Michie/Law. Co-op) (1970)
MICHIGAN, MICH. STAT. ANN. § 420.25 (West) (1973)
MINNESOTA, MNN. STAT. ANN. § 301.18 (West) (1969)
NEVADA, NEv. REV. STAT. § 78.235 (1975)
NEW HAMPSHIRE, N.H. GEN. STAT. § 294:51 (1977)
NORTH CAROLINA, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-57 (1979)
OHIO, OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 1701.24(b) (Page) (1978)
SOUTH CAROLINA, S.C. CODE § 33-9-110(a) (1976)
c. States requiring a certificate unless otherwise provided in the articles of incorporation or
bylaws of the corporation:
GEORGIA, GA. CODE ANN. § 22-508 (1977)
MISSOURI, Mo. ANN. STAT. § 351-295 (Vernon) (1975)
d. States not requiring certificates for shares registered under the '34 Act or the Federal
Investment Company Act of 1940:
CALIFORNIA, CAL. CORP. CODE § 416 (West) (1977).
Hawaii has no specific requirements concerning share certificates.
7' See S. REP. No. 94-75, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 58-59, reprinted in [1975] U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADM. NEWS 179, 236-37, 301.
7' See FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA CORPORATIONS § 4655 (1976).
71 See Order, supra note 12, at n.68. Note also the Transfer Agent Custodian Program
(TAC) which permits a securities depository to maintain a Jumbo certificate with the trans-
fer agent to cover any delivery which may have to be made to a non-participant, thereby
reducing the movement of certificates between the depository and the transfer agent. The
transfer agent can break down the Jumbo certificate and issue shares in accordance with
instructions received. As the need for shares changes, the depository will increase or de-
crease the shares in TAC. Id. at 3921 n.72. An issue arises whether such deposit with the
transfer agent, i.e., TAC would be in compliance with SEC Rules 8c-l(g) and 15c2-1(g), 17
C.F.R. §§ 240.8c-1(g) and 240.15c2-1(g)(1980). In holding that there would be compliance,
the Commission upheld the Fast Automated Securities Transfer (FAST) program instituted
by the Depository Trust Company. See SEC Securities Exchange Act Release Nos. 34-13342
(March 8, 1977) and 34-12353 (April 20, 1976).
78 SUBCOMM. ON SECURITIES OF THE SENATE COMM. ON BANKING, HOUSING AND URBAN
AFFAIRS, 92D CONG., 2D SESS., SECURITIES INDUSTRY STUDY CH. I (1972); SuBcoMM. ON COM-
MERCE AND FINANCE OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON FOREIGN COMMERCE, 92D CONG., 2D SEss; SE-
CURITIES INDUSTRY STUDY Ch. VII (1972). The use of a non-negotiable "initial transaction
statement" is contemplated by the proposed revision of U.C.C. Article 8. See U.C.C. § 8-
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The uncertificated security is not a new concept. In recent years short-
term debt incurred by the federal government, or by some of the indepen-
dent federal agencies, such as The Federal Home Loan Bank, the Federal
Farm Credit Bank, etc., have not been embodied in an instrument but
have been recorded on books specially kept by a Federal Reserve Bank as
fiscal agent of the United States.7s In addition mutual fund shares, partic-
ularly open-ended no load funds, have only rarely issued certificated
shares.8 0
Under the existing provisions of the U.C.C. a security not represented
by an instrument would not be governed by Article 8 - Investment Secur-
ities.81 Transfer of such contract right could not be by negotiation,8 2 but
would be by assignment. Such assignment would require notice to the ob-
ligor to be effective.8s Unless there be a provision in the agreement creat-
ing the contract right that the obligor will not assert any defenses against
an assignee," the assignment would be subject to the rights of and de-
fenses to the obligor.8 5 Third parties claiming rights in such chose in ac-
tion would have to perfect their rights by complying with the require-
ments of U.C.C. Article 9 - Secured Transactions, relating to "general
intangibles."88 In addition, notice of an "adverse claim,' 's8 given to the
issuer of such security "at his chief executive office,"88 should suffice to
protect the "secured party."8 9
408(4) (1977).
71 A Federal Book Entry Deposit System governing Treasury Bills exists in New York's
Federal Reserve Bank since 1970 and in St. Louis since 1971. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 391-395
(1976).
80 Note also dividend reinvestment plans do not issue fractional shares. See Coogan,
Security Interests in Investment Securities Under Revised Article 8 of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code, 92 HAnv. L. Rv. 1013, 1019 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Coogan].
0' The U.C.C., however, does recognize the immobilization of the certificate by provid-
ing for transfer by book entry. See, e.g., U.C.C. §§ 8-313, 8-320. In all these cases there is
presumably a certificate held somewhere in a depository or a TAC.
82 See MODERN SECURrTIEs, supra note 17. Reclamation rules may protect market
participants.
83 See U.C.C. §§ 9-318(3), 9-502(1); RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CONTRACTS § 170(1)
(Tent. Draft Nos. 1-7 Rev., 1973).
See U.C.C. §§ 9-318(1), 9-206(1), 9-102(3).
Cf. U.C.C. § 9-318(1); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTs § 168(1) (Tent. Draft
Nos. 1-7 Rev., 1973).
" See U.C.C. §§ 9-106, 9-103(3). This will require the existence of a security agreement
granting the security interest, see id. §§ 9-105(1)(1), 9-201, signed by the debtor, id. § 9-
203(1)(a), and the filing of a financing statement, id. §§ 9-302, 9-401, containing the infor-
mation required to give third parties notice of the existence of a perfected security interest
in the creditor. Id. § 9-402.
U.C.C. § 8-301(1).
" U.C.C. § 9-103(3)(d). See DEL. CODE. tit. 5A, § 8-313(1) tit. 8, §§ 169, 324 (1967 &
1974); U.C.C. § 8-320(3) (between participants in a clearing corporation, book entry will
perfect pledge of security held by clearing corporation). See also Aronstein, Security Inter-
ests in Securities: How Code Revision Reflects Modern Security Holding Practices, 10
U.C.C. L.J. 289 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Aronstein].
8 U.C.C. § 9-105(1)(m).
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But not every "adverse claim" can be handled in this manner. Only an
adverse claim qualifying as a "security interest created by contract in-
cluding pledge, assignment. . . , other lien or title retention contract...
$$go is covered by U.C.C. Article 9. "A claim that a transfer was or would
be wrongful or that a particular adverse person is the owner of or has an
interest in the security"9' 1 does not necessarily arise out of a contract
qualifying as a "security agreement. ' 92 This deficiency in the U.C.C. re-
quires revision of existing provisions of U.C.C. Article 8 and Article 9. It
is not clear what would be the effect of notice of such an "adverse claim"
against an uncertificated security given only to an issuer where such claim
cannot be perfected under the U.C.C.9 What can be stated, however, is
that the status of bona fide purchaser 9' cannot arise in connection with a
transfer of such intangible neither under the provisions of the U.C.C. at
present in force in most jurisdictions95 nor under general equitable
principles.
The congressional policy expressed in the 1975 Amendments to the
Securities Exchange Act 8 calling for the immoblization of securities cer-
tificates97 rang a responsive chord in the securities industry to completely
abolish such certificates.9 Thus, a revision of U.C.C. Article 8 was under-
taken jointly by the ABA-ALI and the Permanent Editorial Board for the
U.C.C.9 When the revision received the approval of these bodies they
were adopted by the Uniform Laws Commissioners and have now been
enacted in three jurisdictions.200 A cirtique by Peter F. Coogan' 01 concen-
trated on the basic philosophy of the revision:
The draftsmen created rules for uncertificated securities which
generally parallel the rules presently in use for certificated securi-
90 Id. § 9-102(2).
9' Id. § 8-301(1).
92 Id. § 9-105(1)(1).
93 It may be possible to apply U.C.C. § 8-403 by analogy, i.e., the issuer may be given
notice of an adverse claim in writing or he may receive such notice as a result of requiring
controlling instruments when effectuating a transfer. U.C.C. § 8-402(4). There being no "rei-
fication" of the obligation there can be no attachment by physical seizure. Cf. id. § 8-317(1).
Such rights can only be attached following recourse to legal process. See Dan. CODE. tit. 8,
§§ 169, 324 (1974); U.C.C. § 9-501(1).
U.C.C. § 8-302.
" The status of "bona fide purchaser" has been confined historically to a purchaser of
goods and has not been applied to one who has acquired a chose in action.
Pub. L. No. 94-29, 89 Stat. 97 (1975).
' Securities Exchange Act § 17A(e), 15 U.S.C. § 78q-l(e) (1976).
See Smith, A Piece of Paper Revisited, 26 Bus. LAW. 1769 (1971).
" The revision does not require that states permit uncertificated equity securities, nor
does the revised article require an issuer to issue uncertificated securities even should state
corporation law permit it. U.C.C. § 8-102 (1977), Official Comment.
100 The three jurisdictions which have adopted the revisions of Article 8 of the U.C.C.
are Minnesota (Ch. 695, L. 1978, effective Jan. 1, 1979), West Virginia (S.B. 110, L. 1979,
effective May 20, 1979), and Connecticut (P.A. 79-435, effective Oct. 1, 1979).
,o' See Coogan, supra note 79, at 1019.
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ties. This approach appears to reflect a basic philosophical pre-
mise that the rules developed under a half-century of experience
with certificated securities (which in turn were based on several
centuries of development in negotiable instruments law), being
tested and familiar, should generally be applied with a minimum
of modification in the new situations - even though that situa-
tion involves securities for which there is no certificate and for
which there will be no certificates unless the parties agree that
the uncertificated securities be converted into conventional secur-
ities represented by a certificate.102
An "uncertificated security" can exist only in registered form103 and
qualifies for inclusion in revised Article 8 only if it is "of a type commonly
dealt in on securities exchanges or markets."104 This functional require-
ment adequately excludes from the definition "other media for invest-
ment"105 which are reprsented by book entry, such as savings accounts
and which are not dealt in on any securities markets.
Since there is no "reification" of the obligation, a transfer by "deliv-
ery' "1 is not possible. Any attachment of the rights represented by an
"uncertificated security" will require "legal process at the issuer's chief
executive office in the United States,"107 or, where such security is regis-
tered in the name of a secured party or of a "financial intermediary," '
by legal process upon the secured party 09 or "upon the financial interme-
diary on whose books the interest of the debtor appears."
110
Although the concept of negotiability is thus inapplicable to an "un-
certificated security," the revised provisions of U.C.C. Article 8 attempt
102 Id. at 1014.
103 An "uncertificated security" is a share, participation, or other interest in property or
an enterprise of the issuer or an obligation of the issuer which is
(i) not represented by an instrument and the transfer of which is registered
upon books maintained for that purpose by or on behalf of the issuer;
(ii) of a type commonly dealt in on securities exchanges or markets; and
(iii) either one of a class or series or by its terms divisible into a class or series or
shares, participations, interests, or obligations.
U.C.C. § 8-102(1)(b) (1977) (emphasis added).
1I4 U.C.C. § 8-102(1)(b)(ii) (1977).
101 Id. § 8-102(1)(a)(ii) (1977).
106 See MODERN SECURrrms, supra note 17, chs. IV-VI.
207 U.C.C. § 8-317(2) (1977).
108 A financial intermediary is "a bank, broker, clearing corporation, or other person (or
the nominee of any of them) which in the ordinary course of its business maintains security
accounts for its customers and is acting in that capacity." U.C.C. § 8-313(4) (1977). The
"financial intermediary" must "hold" securities in an account for the customer. Though the
securities may actually be deposited elsewhere, they must be at the disposition of the
financial intermediary subject to his customer's orders. Thus a bank pledgee would hold for
its own account, while a broker holding securities in margin account would be a financial
intermediary. Compare SEC Rule 15c3-3(c)(1), (2), 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.15c3-3(c)(1), (2) (1980).
10 See U.C.C. § 8-317(3) (1977).
110 Id. § 8-317(4) (1977).
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to create a "bona fide purchaser" of such "uncertificated security" by
providing that "a purchaser for value in good faith and without notice of
an adverse claim ... (b) to whom the transfer, pledge, or release of an
uncertificated security is registered on the books of the issuer," '111 ac-
quires all the rights which the transferor had or could convey, 1 2 "free of
any adverse claims.""" Notice of "adverse claims" would require either
"actual knowledge" of such claims or from the facts and circumstances
such knowledge is imputed to the purchaser."1 In the case of an uncertifi-
cated security such notice of an adverse claim cannot arise from any nota-
tion on a certificate, it will have to be communicated through the "initial
transaction statement,"'1 5 or through some other periodic statement sub-
mitted by the issuer to the registered owner."' If such notice is not given
to the issuer"1 in time for him to enter such adverse claim on an "initial
transaction statement,"1 1 8 i.e., at the time of (1) a transfer to a new regis-
tered owner,11 9 or (2) a pledge to a registered pledgee,1 20 or prior to the
issuer submitting to the registered owner a periodic statement of ac-
count, 2 ' a transferee or a pledgee would not be aware of an adverse claim
unless he requires the transferor or the pledgor to submit to him a cur-
rent-dated written statement by the issuer setting forth whether or not
there are any liens, restrictions, or adverse claims to the "uncertificated
security. '11 2 A failure to make such request for an "issuer statement,"
however, does not automatically indicate an absence of "good faith" so as
to deprive a purchaser of the status of "bona fide purchaser.' 2  Thus
such a purchaser could insist that he receive an initial transaction state-
ment free from all adverse claims and that he be registered as a registered
owner. 12 4 As we have indicated, this conclusion creates some difficulties.
The policy of following the existing provisions of U.C.C. Article 8 as
closely as possible is extended even to the creation of a pledgee, albeit a
"' Id. 8 8-302(1) (1977).
n Id. § 8-301 (1977).
XI Id. § 8-302(2) (1977) (emphasis added).
1 Id. 88 1-201(25)(26)(27) (1977).
11 Id. §8 8-204(b), 8-408(4) (1977).
, Id. 8§ 8-408(6), (7) (1977).
17 Id. 8 8-403(4) (1977).
-18 Id. § 8-408(4) (1977). Neither the "initial transaction statement" nor any subse-
quent periodic statement or "dated written statement" is a security or a negotiable instru-
ment. Id. § 8-408(9) (1977).
11 Id. § 8-408(1) (1977).
11- Id. 8 8-408(2) (1977).
12 Id. §§ 8-408(6), (7) (1977).
Id.
11- See MODERN SacuRrriEs, supra note 17, § 4.11. The issuer may not have received a
notice of an adverse claim. On the other hand, a failure to make such inquiry, when there
are suspicious circumstances, may be due to a deliberate attempt "not to see what is there
to be seen."
121 In a market transaction, the requirements of "good delivery" and the existence of
"reclamation rights" would protect a purchaser. See note 49 supra.
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registered pledgee, of an incorporeal right. 25 The irrationality of this ap-
proach is further illustrated by the provision that "there can be more
than one registered pledge of an uncertificated security at any time.""'12
There is a conceptual inconsistency here where we are dealing with an
incorporeal right.12 7 Was it necessary to continue the idea of a
"pledge?"' 2 1 To justify not adopting a pure secured interest approach
with priority determined by notice to the issuer on the ground that,
it was a judgment based on practical rather than theorectical con-
siderations. . . .Thus, the first hurdle to be crossed in any move-
ment from certificated to uncertificated securities is to persuade
the issuer to make uncertificated securities available. No issuer is
likely to take that path if it feels that, by doing so, it will expose
itself to unacceptable risks and burdens. The drafters concluded
that a requirement that multiple pledges be registered would im-
pose sufficient additional risks and burdens on issuers to deter
significantly the issuance of an uncertificated securities,"' 2 9
is clearly illogical, unproven and unacceptable. The existing Article 8 pro-
vides for notice of "adverse claims.""s0 There have been no reported cases
of issuers refusing to accept such notice or considering it impossible, a
risk, or a burden to comply with the requirements of Article 8, once such
notice has been received. Sloppy language and sloppy legal conceptualiz-
ing has been the cause of too much litigation. Nor do we need to continue
creating new Alice in Wonderland language."' l The effect of this approach
is to create complications and difficulties that a fresh approach to the
problems created by an uncertificated security could have obviated."s2
It is not our purpose to decry the philosophy underlying the revision
of Article 8, nor to fight against the recognition of the "uncertificated
security." We support the development of legal rules which will assist in
the creation of uncertificated securities should this further the needs of
111 See U.C.C. § 8-108 (1977).
128 Id. § 8-108 (1977).
"I See Coogan, supra note 79, at 102848.
128 Id. The change in commercial transactions from the use of negotiable promissory
notes and drafts to assignments of open accounts has been noted by the draftsmen of Arti-
cle 9, by not patterning that Article on the rules governing the negotiability of commercial
paper. Similarly, any revision of Article 8 or of Article 9 to take account of a security not
represented by a certificate should not attempt to continue concepts inapplicable to such
different commercial transactions.
12 Aronstein, Haydock and Scott, Article 8 Is Ready, 93 HAv. L. REV. 889, 900 (1980);
Aronstein, supra note 87, at 300.
SO See U.C.C. § 8-304.
131 See Conrad, New Deal For Fiduciaries Stock Transfers, 56 MICH. L. REV. 843, 883
n. 162 (1958).
132 We will reserve to a future time a complete analysis of the effect of revised Article 8
and how it can be improved upon. Not having been involved in the work of the 348 Commit-
tee, this criticism levied at Professor Coogan by Aronstein, Haydock and Scott would not be
applicable then.
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the marketplace, as it obviously will. We merely wish to point out that
accepted concepts should not be distorted, that legal rules can be formu-
lated to achieve desired results without creating confused thinking. A re-
vision of the proposed new U.C.C. Article 8 is called for, not to change its
philosophy but to change some of its specifics so as to allow state law to
follow the lead of federal securities law and regulations.
